A Principal has a set of projects, each having di¤erent bene…t potentials, and each requiring a basic technology from one of two experts and time inputs from both experts. Experts enjoy motivation utilities from production, but have private information of their own motivation preferences and project potentials. Technology and time-input choices are experts'private decisions. Experts form a Partnership, which designs a sharing rule and a gatekeeping protocol to determine experts' priority on technology choice. Using a linear cost-share contract that lets experts make minimum pro…ts, the Principal implements the …rst best by delegating all decisions to the Partnership. Acknowledgement: We thank Editor Daniel Houser, and a reviewer for their advice and suggestions. For their many comments, we thank seminar participants at
against the stronger motivation bene…t, so more motivated experts are induced to choose the same …rst best as less motivated experts.
The …rst-best implementation is robust to many ways in which a Partnership is organized. In the basic model, a General Partnership chooses a pro…t sharing rule and a project gatekeeping protocol to maximize experts' joint surplus. In a Seniority Partnership, one expert contracts with the Principal, and chooses a sharing rule and a gatekeeping protocol to maximize his own payo¤. The Principal can o¤er a single contract that implements the …rst best whether experts work together in a General Partnership or a Seniority Partnership.
Results here contrast sharply with the standard solution in the principal-multiagent mechanism design literature; see Mookherjee (2006) for a comprehensive survey. In the canonical model, a Principal designs a reward-punishment scheme which induces each agent to report truthfully his private information, then issues detailed instructions to each agent, and monitors the actions of each agent. We propose an alternative contracting paradigm. We show that the Principal can implement the …rst best by contracting with a partnership that retains private information and decision-making authority. Even more striking, the Principal achieves this implementation by a single contract.
Our model suggests that a Principal bene…ts from contracting with an expert organization. Partnerships can facilitate the match e¢ ciency between projects and expertise. This is consistent with the empirical evidence in professional-service markets. Epstein, Ketcham and Nicholson (2010) investigate obstetric practices and …nd that high-risk patients in group practices match with specialists more often than patients in solo practices. Furthermore, this improves patients'health outcomes.
Our analysis has policy bearings for the ongoing health care reform in the United States. As a bedrock of the reform, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal regulator managing Medicare and Medicaid has been encouraging health care providers to form Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs).
3 In the ACO model, CMS contracts with a group of providers. An ACO is entrusted with coordinating patient care. This often requires sharing of information, consultation, and referrals between physicians within an ACO. Our model predicts that ACOs achieve a higher e¢ ciency and a better care quality if they are paid by a mixture of capitation and cost-sharing contracts rather than by either pure capitation or pure fee-forservice. Cost sharing between clients and service providers is also gaining popularity in the legal profession, which traditionally has billed by hours. 1 The paper belongs to the large principal-multiagent literature. 2 The more recent literature has recognized that agents often have diverse interests. Agents may be either intrinsically or extrinsically motivated in their e¤ort choices or use of private information; see, for example, Akerlof and Kranton (2005) , Benábou and Tirole (2003) , Besley and Ghatak (2005) , Francois (2000) , Khalil, Kim and Lawarrée (2013) , Makris and Siciliani (2013) , Murdock (2002) , Prendergast (2007 Prendergast ( , 2008 . This literature generally studies interaction between motivations and …nancial incentives. However, these papers assume that agents' motivational preferences are common knowledge.
In our paper, the Principal does not know experts'motivation. As far as we know, in an agency context, the missing motivation information assumption has only been studied by Choné and Ma (2011 ), Delfgaauw and Dur (2007 , 2008 , Jack (2005) , and Liu and Ma (2013) . All these show that missing information about an agent's motivation may lead to distortion, so they study second-best incentive contracts. However, all these models consider only a single agent, whereas here we have many agents, who are assumed to know about each other's motivation.
In Baron and Besanko (1992) , Gilbert and Riordan (1995) , and Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) , an organization may consolidate many agents' hidden information of productivity, which may be used by a Principal to prescribe production plans. These papers show that a Principal can bene…t from contracting with an informed organization when agents'inputs are complementary, but not when inputs are substitutes.
"Using
Alternative Fee Arrangements to Increase New Business,", Bloomberg Law, http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/using-alternative-fee-arrangements-to-increase-newbusiness/ 2 Early contributions include Demski and Sappington (1984) , Holmström (1982) , Ma (1988) , and Mookherjee (1984) . The 30-plus years of literature is extensive, so any proper summary is beyond the scope of the current paper. 4 In our model, experts' technologies are substitutes, but their time inputs are complements. However, the Principal can still implement the …rst best by delegating all production decisions to the Partnership. Garicano and Santos (2004) and Grassi and Ma (2016) study experts' referrals under asymmetric information. Referrals in these papers are formally similar to expert gatekeeping in ours. In both papers, referrals lead to ine¢ ciency because of adverse selection. Gatekeeping in our model is performed under complete information by motivated experts. We allow the Partnership to determine the equilibrium gatekeeping protocol, whereas in Garicano and Santos (2004) equilibria are derived under di¤erent given referral protocols.
The economics literature on Partnership is extensive; see, for example, Holmström (1982) , Legros and Matthews (1993) , Levin and Tadelis (2005) , and Strausz (1999) . The usual setup does not consider a Principal contracting with a Partnership. Rather, a Partnership consists of members who have joint ownership. A sharing rule that splits revenues among partners is a scheme to incentivize costly e¤orts. We go one step further and study how a Principal can in ‡uence a Partnership's choices. Furthermore, our concept of a Partnership includes the gatekeeping protocol, which has not been considered in the earlier literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents technologies and the …rst best. Section 3 de…nes the Partnership's internal organization and the Principal's contract. Section 4 studies Partnership surplus maximization under minimum-pro…t constraints. Section 5 shows how sharing rules and gatekeeping protocols implement Partnership surplus maximization and the …rst best simultaneously. In Section 6, one expert becomes a senior partner, and sets up sharing rules and gatekeeping protocols. We show how the Principal continues to implement the …rst best. Finally, Section 7 draws some conclusions. The Appendix contains proofs of results.
Principal and expert services
A Principal has a continuum of production projects with a total mass normalized at one. Projects are de…ned by a bene…t index, b, a random variable distributed on a strictly positive support [b; b] with distribution F and density f . The term "project b" means a project with bene…t index b. For production, the Principal 5 needs services from two experts; we call them Expert 1 and Expert 2.
Each expert is identi…ed by his production function that requires both experts'inputs, which can be each expert's time spent on the project. Expert j's production function is de…ned by R j :
where R j is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function. For each project, at most one expert will be chosen as the primary provider. The output or revenue when Expert j is the primary provider and when Experts 1 and 2, respectively, spend times t 1j and t 2j on project b is R j (t 1j ; t 2j )b, j = 1; 2. (For the time input t ij , the …rst subscript i indicates the identity of the expert who supplies the time, whereas the second subscript j indicates the identity of the primary provider.) Expert 2's production function generates more revenue from the same time inputs, and we will expand on the properties of R j below. The technology costs of Experts 1 and 2 taking on the role of the primary provider are c 1 and c 2 , respectively, with 0 < c 1 < c 2 , so Expert 2 has a higher technology cost than Expert 1. We assume that experts have identical and constant per-unit time cost. 3 We also ignore any capacity constraint, so impose no limits on the number of projects for which an expert can serve as the primary provider, or on the amount of time an expert can spend on a project.
In the Introduction, we have already provided an example in the health industry. There, the generalist physician is Expert 1, and the specialist physician is Expert 2. In other industries, junior lawyers, contractors, and manufacturers take on roles as Expert 1, whereas senior lawyers, architects, and product designers take on roles as Expert 2.
Complete Information
We …rst consider the Principal's optimal allocation when each project's bene…t index b and the experts' actions can be observed by the Principal. The Principal now can dictate the primary-provider assignment and time inputs for each project for maximum surplus. Suppose that Expert j is the primary provider, and
We can let experts' unit time costs be di¤erent, experts' time costs be increasing and strictly convex, or both. In either case, there will just be more notation, but no conceptual consequence. 6 the Principal's maximum surplus from project b when Expert j is the primary provider:
are the optimal times experts should supply to project b when Expert j is the primary provider. 4
For any (t 1 ; t 2 ), we assume that R 1 (t 1 ; t 2 ) and R 2 (t 1 ; t 2 ) satisfy
Expert 1's technology is less powerful than Expert 2's. At any time inputs (t 1 ; t 2 ), Expert 1's technology will generate less output (condition in (3)). Given the assumption on the experts'technology costs, c 1 < c 2 , it is uninteresting to assume that Expert 1's technology is more powerful. Furthermore, the two experts' time inputs exhibit complementarity (condition (4)). Finally, the production functions R 1 and R 2 exhibit increasing di¤erences (condition (5)). These assumptions allow us to derive useful comparative-static results (see Lemma 1).
An allocation assigns, for each project b, the identity of the primary provider, either Expert 1, Expert 2, or none at all, and the time each expert spends on the project if a primary provider is assigned to it.
Projects without a primary provider will not be serviced. The Principal's optimal allocation maximizes its surplus at each b, i.e., maxf0;
, and we call this the …rst best. 5
We …rst present some properties of the optimal times t ij (b) and the surplus functions V j (b).
Figure 1: First best
Lemma 1 The optimal times t ij (b) are increasing in b, i; j = 1; 2, and at each b,
Furthermore, the surplus functions V j (b) when Expert j is the primary provider are both increasing in b, and
Lemma 1 says that each expert's optimal time input increases when the project has a higher bene…t index b, and when the primary provider has a more powerful technology. These results stem from production complementary and increasing di¤erences, respectively, (4) and (5). Also, because Expert 1's technology is less powerful than Expert 2's, the surplus from Expert 1 acting as the primary provider, V 1 (b), increases at a lower rate than if Expert 2 acts as the primary provider, V 2 (b).
The …rst best may prescribe Expert 1 to be the primary provider for some projects, and Expert 2 for others. Or, it may prescribe only one expert to be the primary provider. Clearly, the …rst-best allocation in which each expert is the primary provider for some projects is more interesting. To ensure this, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 There are two bene…t thresholds, b 1 and b 2 , such that
8 Under this assumption, in the …rst best
Expert 1 is the primary provider, and iii) if b 2 b b, Expert 2 is the primary provider, (each expert also putting in the corresponding optimal time t ij (b) i; j = 1; 2, for each serviced project). An example of surplus-function con…guration satisfying Assumption 1 is illustrated in Figure 1 . For given revenue functions R j 's in (1) the assumption is satis…ed when the …xed cost c 1 is small enough and c 2 is not much larger than c 1 . In any case, for revenue functions R j and costs c j , (6) in Assumption 1 is equivalent to 6
When Assumption 1 is violated, in the …rst best one expert will not be a primary provider for any project.
In these cases, the surplus function V 2 may lie entirely above V 1 , or it may be entirely below. Expert 1 would Figure 1 , the part of V 1 that is above V 2 vanishes. Expert 2 would be dominated if b 2 = b, so in Figure 1 , the part of V 2 that is above V 1 disappears. However, our implementation results are robust to surplus-function con…gurations that violate Assumption 1, and we discuss these cases at the end of Section 4.
Motivated experts
We now describe the experts'preferences. Each expert enjoys motivation utility proportional to the output.
If the output from using Expert j's technology for project b is R j b, Expert 1 and Expert 2, respectively, receive utilities 1 R j b and 2 R j b. Here, the parameters 1 and 2 are, respectively, Expert 1's and Expert 2's degrees of motivation, which are distributed on strictly positive supports [ 1 ; 1 ] and [ 2 ; 2 ]. (We do not need notation for distributions and densities.) Motivation parameters interacting linearly with revenues is a common assumption and makes our analysis tractable. 7
The motivation utilities can be intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic utilities are enjoyments from work. For instance, physicians are altruistic towards their patients. Here, the output R j b represents a patient's treat-ment bene…t. The technologies R 1 and R 2 are the available medical services. Both physicians spend time with the patient, so each enjoys some utility. As another example, two lawyers working on a pro bono case enjoy providing public services. Extrinsic utilities refer to potential future earnings from work done with the Principal. A better outcome with the current Principal may bring in more businesses to each expert in the future. Hence, the motivation utilities may indicate the present values of these future returns.
In any case, utilities from motivation are to be distinguished from the monetary payo¤s (pro…ts) experts receive. Intrinsic or extrinsic utilities 1 R j b and 2 R j b do not count toward monetary pro…t. In the case of 1 R j b and 2 R j b representing enjoyment (intrinsic bene…ts), this is a natural interpretation. In the case of 1 R j b and 2 R j b representing future earnings (extrinsic bene…ts), this means that experts cannot borrow against them, which is also natural. We assume that any monetary payo¤ will add onto the motivation utility in an additive way.
Each expert must attain a reservation utility; this is a constraint universally adopted in agency problems.
Suppose that Expert j's motivation parameter is j , j = 1; 2 and the (total) output turns out to be Q, his motivation utility will be j Q. If he also earns pro…t j , his total utility is j Q + j . If the reservation utility is U j , the expert does not participate unless j Q + j U j . In addition, Expert j may earn a pro…t j if he does not participate. Because motivation utilities cannot be capitalized, for participation Expert j's payo¤ and pro…t must satisfy j Q + j U j and j j .
Following Liu and Ma (2013) , Makris (2009) , Makris and Siciliani (2013) , and Olivella and Siciliani (2017) , we assume that j j is the only relevant constraint, so j Q + j U j is slack. E¤ectively, we assume that the reservation utility level U j is not much higher than the minimum pro…t j . The justi…cation is simply that the expert's outside option rarely o¤ers motivation utility; most jobs merely earn an expert the minimum pro…t. 8 Furthermore, an expert considering contracting with the Principal obviously favors the Principal's projects over alternatives. That indicates a better motivation-utility prospect from the Principal's projects than those elsewhere.
Partnership, budget, and information
The …rst best requires, for each project, assigning an expert to be the primary provider, and each expert's optimal time given the primary provider. However, the Principal only knows the project bene…t distribution and the range of the experts' motivation parameters but not their actual values. Moreover, the Principal can only verify the total cost (technology and time costs) incurred by the two experts after production. The
Principal must delegate all the production decisions to the experts and compensate them according to the total cost. Nevertheless, experts work together, so they may be able to share information and incentivize the primary-provider assignment as well as time inputs. We model the work relationship between experts as a Partnership.
A Partnership is a …ctitious player with preferences equal to the sum of the experts'payo¤s. In addition, we restrict or empower a Partnership in three ways. First, a Partnership does not receive any new revenue other than what the Principal pays the experts, and it cannot dispose of received revenues other than through the experts. A Partnership must split revenues by way of a sharing rule, to be de…ned below. Second, a
Partnership has information of each expert's degree of motivation, 1 and 2 , as well as records of how many projects each expert has served as the primary provider, and each expert's total cost (technology and time costs). The information can be used in setting up a sharing rule. Third, the Partnership can decide which of the two experts is a gatekeeper. The gatekeeping protocol is described next, in Stages 2 and 3 of the extensive form.
Gatekeeping protocol and extensive form
The Partnership decentralizes the primary-provider assignment and time inputs in the following extensive form. Certain details in the extensive form such as the Principal's contract and the Partnership sharing rule will be de…ned later.
Stage 0 Nature draws the bene…t indexes of the Principal's continuum of projects according to distribution F . Nature draws Expert j's motivation parameter according to some distribution on [ j ; j ], j = 1; 2.
Realizations of bene…t indexes and motivation parameters are unknown to the Principal. The experts' motivation parameters are common knowledge among the experts. The Principal o¤ers a contract to the Partnership.
Stage 1 If the Partnership rejects the contract, the game ends. If the Partnership accepts the Principal's contract, it selects an expert, say Expert i, i = 1; 2, to be the gatekeeper, and sets up a sharing rule to maximize the experts'joint payo¤ subject to minimum pro…ts.
Stage 2 For each project, gatekeeper Expert i observes the bene…t index b and decides whether to abandon the project, become the primary provider, or let Expert j, j = 1; 2 and j 6 = i, take his turn.
Stage 3 If gatekeeper Expert i passes on a project to Expert j for the primary-provider decision, Expert j observes the bene…t index, and decides whether to abandon the project or become the primary provider.
Stage 4 Knowing the bene…t index, the two experts simultaneously choose the time inputs for each project that has a primary provider. The technology costs and time costs are incurred. The Partnership will be paid by the Principal according to the contract, and the experts will split pro…t according to the sharing rule.
Principal' s contract and Partnership sharing rule
The Principal can verify the Partnership's total cost. Although complicated cost-sharing contracts can be used, we consider a simple, quasi-linear contract ( ; s) which consists of a lump sum and speci…es that the Partnership is responsible for a fraction s, 0 s 1, of the total cost. 9 Let C 1 and C 2 be the total technology and time costs incurred by Experts 1 and 2, respectively. The Principal's contract pays the Partnership a total of + (1 s)(C 1 + C 2 ). We use the accounting rule that the Partnership bears the experts'total production costs. After subtracting costs, the Partnership nets s(C 1 + C 2 ).
Experts have more information than the Principal. They know each other's motivation parameters, the total cost incurred by each expert, and the mass of projects for which an expert acts as the primary provider.
Experts use this information to design a pro…t sharing rule. Let i (M 1 ; M 2 ; C 1 ; C 2 ; 1 ; 2 ), i = 1; 2 denote the payment to Expert i, where M 1 and M 2 are the masses of projects for which Expert 1 and 2 are, respectively, primary providers. A sharing rule is de…ned by the pair ( 1 ; 2 ) such that for any M 1 , M 2 , C 1 ,
On the left-hand side of (7), payments from the Principal are independent of the motivation parameters and how the total cost is generated. On the right-hand side of (7), the split of the Principal's payments may depend on each expert's service decisions, but the split must always be equal to the net payment from the
, and his payo¤ is his pro…t together with the total motivation bene…t.
Optimal contract and Partnership surplus
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, in this section, we study an auxiliary game which has only two stages. Stage 0 is the same as the extensive form in Subsection 3.2. In Stage 1, if the Partnership accepts the contract, it chooses an allocation to maximize its surplus subject to the Partnership's minimum-pro…t constraint, which is also the participation constraint. An allocation speci…es which expert, if any, is the primary provider of each project b, and each expert's time input at every b, and experts simply execute the chosen allocation. The Partnership's maximum surplus in the auxiliary game is the upper bound of its surplus in the extensive form game in Subsection 3.2. This is because experts are obedient in the auxiliary game but need to be incentivized in the extensive form game.
Second, in the following section, we study the experts' incentives when the Partnership cannot dictate their actions. We will show that the Partnership can achieve its maximum surplus as in the auxiliary game by selecting an expert to be a gatekeeper and writing a sharing rule to align experts'incentives.
We de…ne a Partnership's degree of motivation as the sum of those of the experts, namely 1 + 2 .
13
We will use the term "Partnership " to denote a Partnership with degree of motivation . Given the Principal's contract ( ; s), we de…ne
to be Partnership 's surplus (gross of the transfer ) when Expert j is the primary provider for project b, and when Expert i with motivation parameter i puts in time input t ij , i; j = 1; 2. For project b, the Partnership's maximum surplus is maxf0; W 1 (b; ; s); W 2 (b; ; s)g.
We begin with the relationship between the …rst best and Partnership surplus. In fact, the Partnership
so the optimal times for maximizing (8) 
It follows that Lemma 1 applies to (8). Partnership 's maximum surplus is maxf0; We consider one particular Principal's contract. We will show that under this contract, any Partnership chooses the …rst best for maximum surplus under the minimum-pro…t constraint. This contract is ( ; s ):
The contract says that a Partnership bears a fraction s = 1 + 2 of its cost, this fraction being the minimum motivation among all Partnerships; the transfer is its unreimbursed total cost at the …rst-best allocation and the minimum pro…ts. Expert i is to be the primary provider for project b. We impose the restriction 0 1 (b) + 2 (b) 1. Given the contract ( ; s ), Partnership chooses assignment functions i (b), and time inputs t ij (b), i; j = 1; 2 to maximize:
Our …rst result describes the surplus of the least motivated Partnership.
Lemma 2 Given the contract ( ; s ), the least motivated Partnership 1 + 2 maximizes its total surplus and makes the minimum pro…t 1 + 2 by choosing the …rst-best allocation.
From (9) Lemma 3 Given the contract ( ; s ), the minimum-pro…t constraint (12) binds for each Partnership > .
Facing the same cost-share rate s = , a Partnership values outputs more when its degree of motivation increases. In fact, if the minimum-pro…t constraint (12) does not bind, Partnership > must respond by serving more projects and investing more time inputs, and consequently making less pro…t.
Next, because the minimum-pro…t constraint (12) must bind, we write the objective function (11) as
Partnership chooses i and t ij , i; j = 1; 2 to maximize (13) subject to the minimum-pro…t constraint (12), which, we emphasize, is independent of . Obviously, an allocation is a solution of Partnership 's maximization of (13) subject to the binding constraint (12) if and only if it is a solution of Partnership b 's
subject to the same binding constraint (12), any and b . But we know that at = , the …rst best maximizes the Partnership's surplus and the minimum-pro…t constraint binds. Lemma 3 says that the minimum-pro…t constraint of any Partnership b with b > must also bind, so we have our main result in this section (proof omitted):
Proposition 1 Given the contract ( ; s ), a Partnership of any degree of motivation 1 + 2 maximizes the Partnership total surplus and makes the minimum pro…ts by choosing the …rst-best allocation.
Proposition 1 says that, under the contract ( ; s ), the …rst-best allocation maximizes the surplus of all Partnerships subject to the minimum-pro…t constraint. It is a striking result, yet is based simply on monotonicity. Higher motivation encourages more service provisions and time inputs. Each Partnership, however, must respect the minimum-pro…t constraint. When the least motivated Partnership just breaks even, a more motivated Partnership must …nd the minimum-pro…t constraint binding.
To close this section, we document the changes in the Principal's contract when Assumption 1 is violated.
Then we have the two cases that are described at the end of Subsection 2.1. First, when the surplus function (10). Second, when the surplus function V 2 is dominated by V 1 , we replace b 2 by b for the contract in (10). All results in this section remain valid after these changes. When one expert is never the primary provider for any projects, replacing b 1 by b 2 or b 2 by b are all that are needed for adjusting the sharing rules for implementation. any equilibrium of the extensive form must also be …rst best. In the next two subsections, we construct such a subgame, in which Expert 1 is the gatekeeper. There may well be other subgames that achieve the …rst best. In these other subgames, Expert 2 is the gatekeeper; we will come to these equilibria later.
Gatekeeper Expert 1 and sharing rule
The Principal's contract ( ; s ) pays a lump sum and (1 s ) of the total cost. A sharing rule splits the net revenue between the experts in terms of (M 1 ; M 2 ; C 1 ; C 2 ), where M i , i = 1; 2, are the masses of projects for which Expert i is the primary provider, and where C i are Expert i's total technology and time costs. The sharing rule must also be budget balanced, as in (7). Experts' preferences are common knowledge within the Partnership and their motivation parameters are used in the sharing rule.
Suppose that in Stage 1 the Partnership decides that Expert 1 is the gatekeeper (so Expert 1 gets priority to decide how projects are to be processed in Stage 2, while Expert 2 only gets his turn in Stage 3). We construct a budget-balanced sharing rule that implements the …rst best:
b 1 and b 2 are the …rst-best thresholds, and is some constant. 10
The sharing rule requires more information than the Principal's contract (which is based only on the total costs), but is quasi-linear (same as the Principal's contract). First, the sharing rule depends on experts' motivation parameters. Second, it keeps track of how many projects for which each expert has chosen to be the primary provider. Third, it depends on the total time and technology costs incurred by each expert. Under our accounting rule, the Partnership bears all the costs, and receives all the revenues from the Principal, so experts'net payments are entirely determined by the sharing rule. The sum of (14) and (15) is simply s (C 1 + C 2 ), so it is always budget balanced as required by (7).
There are two basic components: each expert's total costs, C 1 and C 2 , and the project masses for which experts are primary providers, M 1 and M 2 . Experts'decisions on time inputs have no e¤ect on M 1 and M 2 .
However, if Expert j decides to be a primary provider, he changes both M j and C j .
Condition (14) 
Expert 1's decisions in Stage 2 are more complicated. First, he has the option to take on project b. If he does so, he raises the measure M 1 by one, so pays 1 . He also has to bear the increment in technology and time costs C 1 at rate 1 . The cost C 2 will also increase by Expert 2's time input, and Expert 1 receives
( 2 s ) of that increase. His net payment is
18 Expert 1's second option is to pass on project b to Expert 2. Assume that Expert 2 will then take on the project. Condition (14) gets Expert 1 to bear his own time cost 1 t 12 (b), but it also gets him to receive an amount 2 + ( 2 s )[c 2 + t 22 (b)] due to Expert 2's cost and his being the primary provider. Expert 1's net payment is
. Finally, Expert 1 may just abandon the project and nets 0.
Gatekeeper Expert 1 and implementation
We have just laid out the experts' net payment consequences in each stage. Now we derive the subgameperfect equilibria. In Stage 4, only time inputs are to be decided on any project b when an expert has chosen to be a primary provider. We have seen that the sharing rule makes Expert i bear i of his time cost.
Because Expert i gets a motivational bene…t at i of the output, he internalizes the social cost and bene…t.
The following result is immediate.
Lemma 4 In the subgame-perfect equilibrium in Stage 4, each expert chooses the …rst-best time inputs t ij (b)
for every project b when Expert j is the primary provider, i; j = 1; 2.
Lemma 4 pins down the values of t ij (b) in the two experts'continuation equilibrium payo¤s in Stage 4.
It also implies that the …rst best is implemented when there are 1 and 2 so that Experts 1 and 2 take on projects as primary providers if and only if b 1 b < b 2 and b b 2 , respectively.
In Stage 3, Expert 2 decides whether to become a primary provider or abandon the projects that Expert 1 has chosen to pass on. If Expert 2 chooses to abandon a project, his incremental payo¤ is zero. If Expert 2 chooses to be the primary provider for project b, he assumes the continuation equilibrium in Lemma 4.
The net payment can be obtained from Subsection 5.1. Together with the motivation bene…t, Expert 2's payo¤ will be 2 [R 2 (t 12 (b); t 22 (b))b c 2 t 22 (b)] 2 + ( 1 s )t 12 (b). We use the value of 2 in (17) and the continuation equilibrium payo¤s to show the following.
Lemma 5 In the subgame-perfect equilibrium in Stage 3, Expert 2 takes on a project b as the primary provider if and only if b b 2 . and the steps for this expression are in the proof of the lemma. Given the sharing rule and the continuation equilibrium in Stage 4, Expert 2 internalizes any surplus di¤erence between project b and the threshold project b 2 (the …rst term), as well as any di¤erence in Expert 1's time input costs (the second term).
Because both V 2 and t 12 are increasing in b and s = 1 + 2 , Expert 2's decision in Stage 3 will implement the …rst best for all projects with bene…t parameters above b 2 .
In Stage 2, Expert 1 chooses between abandoning a project, becoming the primary provider, and passing it on. Then Expert 2's decision will result in a continuation equilibrium described by Lemma 5 in Stage 3, and then Lemma 4 in Stage 4. First, if Expert 1 chooses to take on project b, his payo¤ is
, which is the motivation bene…t plus the net payment speci…ed in Subsection 5.1. Second, if Expert 1 passes the project on to Expert 2, then, according to Lemma 5, Expert 2 will abandon it if b < b 2 , but will provide service otherwise. Expert 1's payo¤ when
where, again, we have added the motivation bene…t to the net payment described in Subsection 5.1. We use the values of 1 in (16), 2 in (17) and the continuation equilibrium payo¤s to show the following. We use 1 in (16) and the continuation equilibrium payo¤s in Stage 4 to simplify Expert 1's payo¤ from being the primary provider to
where the steps for the equality are spelled out in the proof of the lemma. Payo¤ (19) Next, we use 2 in (17) and the continuation equilibrium in Stage 3 to simplify Expert 1's equilibrium payo¤ if he passes on a project b > b 2 to Expert 2:
where the steps for the equality are in the proof. Here, the choice of 2 and the more productive Expert 2 actually let Expert 1 gain more than what he can internalize from being the primary provider. For projects b > b 2 , our choice of 2 in (17) aligns both Expert 1's incentive to pass on a project and Expert 2's incentive to be primary provider. In Figure 2 , we plot Expert 1's equilibrium payo¤s in (19) for being the primary provider for all projects in the lower graph, and Expert 1's equilibrium payo¤s in (20) when Expert 2 is the primary provider for projects b > b 2 in the upper graph.
Our preceding three lemmas completely characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in the subgame de…ned by gatekeeper Expert 1 and the sharing rule in (14) to (17). Projects b < b 1 will be abandoned by either expert. Projects with b between b 1 and b 2 will be served by Expert 1 (and rejected by 21 Expert 2). Projects with b higher than b 2 will be served by Expert 2 (and also served by Expert 1-o¤ the equilibrium path). First-best time inputs will be supplied to those projects with a primary provider. Any subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is …rst best. Finally, recall that we have used a constant in the de…nition of the sharing rule. Its value is de…ned in footnote 10, and makes sure that in any subgame-perfect equilibrium, each expert earns the minimum pro…t. The three lemmas together say that gatekeeper Expert 1 and the sharing rule implement the allocation that maximizes Partnership surplus in any continuation equilibrium. 11 Hence, it is a best response for the Partnership to use Expert 1 as a gatekeeper and the sharing rule in (14) to (17). We conclude by stating the result formally.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the Principal o¤ ers the contract ( ; s ). In the extensive form in Subsection 3.2, there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the Partnership chooses Expert 1 as the gatekeeper and the budget-balanced sharing rule de…ned by (14) to (17), and the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is …rst best, with Expert 1's equilibrium pro…t being 1 , and Expert 2's equilibrium pro…t being 2 . Furthermore, because this equilibrium outcome also maximizes Partnership surplus, every subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome must be …rst best.
Gatekeeper Expert 2 and sharing rule
What about subgames in which Expert 2 is the gatekeeper? It turns out that the …rst best may be a continuation equilibrium when the Principal o¤ers the same contract ( ; s ) under some conditions. In these cases, there are multiple subgame-perfect equilibria.
Lemma 7 Suppose that the Principal o¤ ers the contract ( ; s ). If Expert 2 is the gatekeeper and t 12 (b) t 11 (b) is nondecreasing in b, there is a sharing rule so that the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is the …rst best with each expert making his minimum pro…t.
Any budget-balanced, quasi-linear sharing rule must take the form in (14) and (15). For …rst-best time inputs, each expert must internalize the time cost and motivational bene…t. Experts 1 and 2 have motivation (14), and Expert 2 should bear 2 of the cost C 2 in (15). The other terms that involve costs C 1 and C 2 in (14) and (15) are there to maintain budget balance. Then there remain only two other instruments for other incentives, namely 1 and 2 , and the terms involving project masses M 1 and M 2 must also maintain budget balance. Proposition 2 says that such instruments, 1 and 2 , are su¢ cient for …rst-best implementation when Expert 1 is the gatekeeper.
In fact, the piece rate 2 in (17) ensures that Expert 2 will only provide service to projects b > b 2 . Hence, Expert 1's decision is nontrivial only for projects b > b 2 .
The same consideration does not hold when Expert 2 is the gatekeeper. For …rst-best implementation, Expert 1 must be willing to be the primary provider for projects with b between b 1 and b 2 . Because Expert 1's payo¤ is monotone increasing in b, Expert 1 must also be willing to be the primary provider for projects b > b 2 . Therefore, Expert 2, as a gatekeeper, faces a nontrivial decision for a wider range of projects, all those with bene…t indexes between b 1 and b.
When t 12 (b) t 11 (b) is nondecreasing in b, Expert 2's gain from taking on a project against passing on the project is increasing in b and the …rst best can be implemented. Here, the comparison between Expert 2's payo¤s from taking on project b as a primary provider and passing on the project is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3 . Nevertheless, when t 12 (b) t 11 (b) is decreasing in b, Expert 2's gain from being a primary provider for a project against passing it on may not be monotone increasing. As a result, Expert 2 may choose to be the primary provider for projects with very high and very low bene…ts, but pass on projects with intermediate bene…ts. This possibility is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 3 . In this case, the …rst best is not a continuation equilibrium.
Seniority Partnerships
We have used the Partnership as a …ctitious player to represent the charter and governance set up by the experts when they form the organization. The …rst-best implementation results, however, are more general, and apply to alternate governance forms. Now we consider two other partnership designs. In each, one expert becomes the Senior Partner, whereas the other is the Junior Partner. (We will use the term General
Partnership to refer to the Partnership-as-a-…ctitious-player organization.)
The Senior Partner and the Junior Partner are joint owners, and they continue to split revenues and costs according to a sharing rule. However, the Senior Partner decides on accepting and rejecting the Principal's contract, the gatekeeping protocol, and the sharing rule. The Senior Partner will make these decisions based on his own preferences (instead of the aggregated preferences of experts). However, we maintain the same information structure and contractible states as in the implementation under General Partnership, so the functional form of the sharing rule remains the same as in (14) and (15).
We study, in turn, Expert 1 as the Senior Partner, and Expert 2 as the Senior Partner. In each case, the extensive form is identical to the one in Subsection 3.2 except that in Stage 1, the Senior Partner (rather than the …ctitious Partnership) makes all the decisions. Can the Principal entrust a Seniority Partnership to implement the …rst best? How does the seniority governance a¤ect the Principal's contract, gatekeeping protocol, and the sharing rule?
Senior Partner Expert 1
The …rst best can be implemented by the following Principal's cost-sharing contract
This new contract is obtained by replacing 1 + 2 in (10) by 1 ; this is the only di¤erence. The
Principal now uses the least motivated Expert 1 to construct the contract.
Given the Principal's contract ( b ; b s), Senior Partner Expert 1 chooses a gatekeeping protocol and a sharing rule in Stage 1 to maximize his own payo¤ in the continuation equilibrium. As in Sections 4 and 5, we show implementation in two steps. First, we consider the surplus that Expert 1 can achieve if he can dictate an allocation. We obtain a result analogous to Proposition 1: given the Principal's contract in (21) 
; this is Expert 1's payo¤ from optimal time inputs when he chooses Expert j to be the primary provider, j = 1; 2. For any project b, Expert 1's surplus is maxf0; W 1 1 (b; 1 ; b s); W 1 2 (b; 1 ; b s)g, net of any …xed payment. Expert 1's surplus is isomorphic to the Partnership surplus in (8), which has the form maxf0; W 1 (b; ; s); W 2 (b; ; s)g (with = 1 + 2 ), so Expert 1 is like a General Partnership with (total) motivation parameter 1 . The following lemma follows from an adaptation of results in Section 4.
Lemma 8 Suppose that Expert 1 chooses an allocation to maximize his own payo¤ subject to minimum pro…ts. If the Principal o¤ ers the contract ( b ; b s) in Stage 0, Expert 1 of any degree of motivation maximizes his payo¤ by choosing the …rst best.
Lemma 8 has the same logic as Lemmas 2 and 3 (which prove Proposition 1). If Senior Partner Expert 1 could dictate all decisions, he would internalize Expert 2's technology costs and time inputs, and would pay Expert 2 the minimum pro…t. Hence, Senior Partner Expert 1 with motivation parameter 1 is like a General Partnership with motivation parameter = 1 + 0. But now the contract ( b ; b s) from the Principal is simply 25 adjusting for this lower degree of motivation from ( ; s ), the one in (10). The …rst best maximizes the least motivated Expert 1's surplus, and his minimum-pro…t constraint just binds. The binding minimum-pro…t constraint deters a more motivated Expert 1 from rendering services more generous than the …rst best.
Can Expert 1 choose a gatekeeping protocol and design a corresponding sharing rule in Stage 1 to implement the …rst best? The following proposition gives an a¢ rmative answer.
Proposition 3 Given the Principal's contract ( b ; b s), there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which Senior
Partner Expert 1 works as the gatekeeper and sets the following sharing rule
for some constant . Any subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is …rst best, and gives each expert his minimum pro…t.
The sharing rule for implementation is essentially identical to the one in Subsection 5.1. There, the General Partnership uses the sharing rule (14) to (17) For brevity, we do not study those equilibria in which Senior Partner Expert 1 assigns Expert 2 as the gatekeeper. From Lemma 7, the equilibrium outcome may not always be the …rst best in the general Partnership. We expect the same di¢ culty when Expert 1 is the Senior Partner. 26
Senior Partner Expert 2
The case of Expert 2 being the Senior Partner works in the same logic. We simply reverse the experts'roles in the previous subsection. The analysis works in an analogous way. First, the Principal replaces 1 in the contract ( b ; b s) in (21) by 2 , the lowest of Expert 2's degrees of motivation. Lemma 8 directly applies.
Senior Partner Expert 2 of any degree of motivation chooses the …rst best to maximize his payo¤ and the two experts make their minimum pro…ts. Implementation remains the same as when Expert 1 is the Senior Partner. Expert 2 chooses Expert 1 as the gatekeeper, switches the value of b s in the sharing rule (22) to (25) from 1 to 2 , and adjusts the lump sum transfers accordingly.
Robust Principal' s contract
We have shown that the …rst best can be implemented under either Expert 1 or Expert 2 Seniority Partnerships. The Principal has used di¤erent contracts for the …rst-best implementation. In fact, we now describe an even stronger result: a single Principal's contract can implement the …rst best whether experts form a General Partnership or a Seniority Partnership.
We have assumed that Expert i's motivation parameter is drawn from support [ i ; i ], a strictly positive interval. Suppose that the Principal, perhaps overly conservatively, thought that the support was really
That is, the Principal believed that the least motivated expert was less generous than Expert i . The Principal would have constructed the contracts using the lower motivation parameters, in General and Seniority Partnerships. However, Propositions 2 and 3 continue to hold! The reason is that for any General and Seniority Partnerships having larger motivation parameters, their minimum-pro…t constraints bind, and maximize surpluses by the …rst-best allocation. The following is immediate.
Proposition 4 If the Principal o¤ ers the contract
where 0 < e < minf 1 ; 2 g < 1 + 2 = , any of the General or Senior Partnerships with motivation higher than e makes the minimum pro…ts and implements the …rst best as a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome.
The Proposition implies a discontinuity at = 0. That is, if the support of an expert's motivation parameter is [0; j ], a contract that sets e s = 0 in (26) 
Conclusion
We show how a Principal can successfully delegate project production decisions to experts who operate in a Partnership. Despite the lack of project information and experts'preferences, the Principal uses a single cost share contract for the delegation. Our theory is predicated on how the Partnership is assumed to operate.
First, within the Partnership, experts share information about projects and their own preferences. Second, the Partnership can set up a sharing rule that is based on each expert's individual time inputs and technology choices. Third, the Partnership can set up a gatekeeping protocol to structure technology decision priorities.
The Principal's contract is contingent on the Partnership's total production cost. In fact, the Principal keeps track of nothing about each individual expert's technology and time-input choices. Moreover, the contract's reimbursement rate only depends on the preference of the least motivated Partnership. So, the Principal does not need to know experts'motivation distribution. The Partnership sharing rule adjusts for di¤erences in experts'preferences. Also, the Partnerships weakly prefers to give technology-choice priority to the low-cost-low-productivity Expert 1. This gatekeeping protocol-generalist physician as gatekeeper referring to specialist physician-is commonly observed in the health care market.
Clearly, many extensions of our model are possible. An obvious one concerns projects that require more than two experts. In this case, Partnerships will also have more than two experts. The …rst best can be straightforwardly de…ned. However, gatekeeping can take place in a hierarchical fashion, and one expert can pass on a project either up or down the hierarchy. Sharing rules must also be enriched. Our preliminary work suggests a monotonicity result: e¢ ciency can be achieved when hierarchical priority starts from the least-cost-least-productive expert and goes up.
We have assumed that experts' reservation utilities are not much higher than their minimum pro…ts, so the minimum-pro…t constraint is the participation constraint. This also means that experts' outside options are independent of their types, a common assumption in agency models. The experience in the extant agency literature is that relaxing this assumption to allow type-dependent reservation utilities tends to be di¢ cult, but is clearly of interest. Finally, experts play a game of complete information within the Partnership (although they do choose time inputs simultaneously). Any incomplete information about motivation bene…ts would necessarily complicate the model. Again, this possible exploration is of interest but for future research.
Proof of Lemma 1: De…ne a function y :
First, by (4), the function y is supermodular in (t 1 ; t 2 ). Second, consider (t 0 1 ; t 0 2 ) and (t 1 ; t 2 ) with (t 0 1 ; t 0 2 ) (t 1 ; t 2 ) and (t 0 1 ; t 0 2 ) 6 = (t 1 ; t 2 ), and the di¤erence y(t 0
Clearly, the di¤erence is increasing in b. The di¤erence is also increasing in (5). We can now apply Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Shannon (1994, p.164) . The optimal times t ij (b) are increasing in b and satisfy t i1 (b) < t i2 (b), i = 1; 2.
By the envelope theorem, we have dV j (b) db = R j (t 1j (b); t 2j (b)) > 0. By (3) and the …rst part of the lemma,
The convexity of V j follows from the positive partial derivatives of R j and the optimal times t ij (b) increasing in b.
Proof of Lemma 2: First, we ignore the minimum-pro…t constraint for Partnership . By (8), the unconstrained maximization of (11) yields the surplus maxf0; W 1 (b; ; s ); W 2 (b; ; s )g by pointwise optimization at b. By (9), we have
We conclude that Partnership chooses the …rst best for the unconstrained maximization of (11).
It remains to show that the omitted minimum-pro…t constraint is satis…ed. Partnership 's total cost is
According to the contract ( ; s ), this total cost is completely reimbursed, so the Partnership nets 1 + 2 .
We conclude that the minimum-pro…t constraint is satis…ed.
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose not; that is, suppose that the minimum-pro…t constraint for Partnership > does not bind. Partnership > then chooses an allocation to solve the unconstrained maximization of (11). Using pointwise optimization, we have the maximum surplus at project b given by
Recall the de…nitions of V j and t ij in (1) and (2).
Therefore, if at b, we have 0 V 1 (b), we also have 0 < V 1 b . This means that Partnership must provide service to more projects than in the …rst best. Also, if at b,
. Expert 2 must be the primary provider for more projects than the …rst best.
The total cost incurred by Partnership must be strictly more than the cost at …rst best
Therefore, the pro…t it earns from contract ( ; s ) is less than 1 + 2 , which is a contradiction. We conclude that the minimum-pro…t constraint (12) 
which is the de…nition of the …rst-best time inputs in (2).
where the …rst equality follows from adding and subtracting t 21 (b), and where the second equality follows from our choice of 1 in (16). Clearly, from Assumption 1 and Lemma 1, we have V 1 (b) > 0 and t 21 (b) t 21 (b 1 ) > 0 if and only if b > b 1 . In the continuation equilibrium in Lemma 5, Expert 2 will abandon projects with indexes below b 2 . It follows that for any b < b 2 , Expert 1's best response is that in the lemma.
Next, if b > b 2 and he passes the project on to Expert 2. According to Lemma 5, Expert 2 will be primary provider, so Expert 1's payo¤ is
This payo¤ is strictly bigger than 1 V 1 (b) + ( 1 + 2 s )[t 21 (b) t 21 (b 1 )] for b > b 2 , Expert 1's payo¤ from being primary provider (because V 2 (b) > V 1 (b), and t 22 (b) > t 21 (b)). We conclude that Expert 1 strictly prefers to pass on any project b > b 2 to Expert 2. Expert 1's best response for project b > b 2 is as described in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 7: We prove the lemma by showing that a sharing rule can implement the …rst best in the new extensive-form game if t 12 (b) t 11 (b) is nondecreasing in b. The sharing rule is e 1 (M 1 ; M 2 ; C 1 ; C 2 ; 1 ; 2 ) = e 1 C 1 + ( 2 s )C 2 e 1 M 1 + e 2 M 2 (28) e 2 (M 1 ; M 2 ; C 1 ; C 2 ; 1 ; 2 ) = e + ( 1 s )C 1 2 C 2 + e 1 M 1 e 2 M 2 ;
where
First, observe that (28), (29) are identical to (14), (15) except for the values of piece rates e 1 , e 2 and constant e . Hence, (28) and (29) must also be budget-balanced. Lemma 4 also straightforwardly applies to Stage 4 of the new extensive-form game. Given (28) and (29), each expert must choose the …rst-best time inputs t ij (b) for every project b.
Now consider Expert 1's decisions in Stage 3. Based on (28), Expert 1's incremental payo¤ from serving project b he has received from Expert 2 is
By Lemma 1, both V 1 (b) and t 21 (b) are increasing in b. Now substitute the de…nition of e 1 in (30) into (33) and evaluate e u 1 (b) at b 1 , we have e u 1 (b 1 ) > 0. Because e u 1 (b) is continuous and increasing in b, there exists a cuto¤ value e b 1 < b 1 such that e u 1 (b) 0 if and only if b e b 1 .
In Stage 2, Expert 2 chooses among abandoning a project, becoming the primary provider for the project, 33 and passing on the project to Expert 1. By (29), Expert 2's incremental gain from taking on project b is e u 2 (b) 2 R 2 (t 12 (b); t 22 (b))b 2 (t 22 (b) + c 2 ) + ( 1 s )t 12 (b) e 2 = 2 V 2 (b) + ( 1 + 2 s )t 12 (b) e 2 ;
whereas his incremental gain from passing on a project to Expert 1 is
if b e b 1 , and e u P 2 (b) = 0 if b < e b 1 . By Lemma 1, V 2 (b), t 12 (b), V 1 (b), and t 11 (b) are increasing in b, so both (34) and (35) are increasing in b.
We …rst consider e u P 2 (b). Substitute e 1 de…ned in (30) into (35) and evaluate e u P 2 (b) at b 1 , we have e u P 2 (b 1 ) = 0 because V 1 (b 1 ) = 0 by Assumption 1. We conclude that e u P 2 (b) > 0 if b > e b 1 and e u P 2 (b) = 0 if b e b 1 .
We next compare e u 2 (b) with e u P 2 (b). For each project b e b 1 , the di¤erence between e u 2 (b) and e u P 2 (b) is e u 2 (b) e u 2 (b) e u P 2 (b) = 2 (V 2 (b) V 1 (b)) + ( 1 + 2 s )(t 12 (b) t 11 (b) c 1 ) e 1 e 2 = 2 (V 2 (b) V 1 (b)) + ( 1 + 2 s )[ft 12 (b) t 11 (b)g ft 12 (b 2 ) t 11 (b 2 )g]:
Because V 2 (b 2 ) = V 1 (b 2 ) by Assumption 1, we have e u 2 (b 2 ) = 0. Di¤erentiating (36) with respective to b yields @ e u 2 (b) @b
By Lemma 1, we have V 0
Now suppose that t 12 (b) t 11 (b) is nondecreasing in b. We have maxfe u 2 (b); e u P 2 (b); 0g = The …rst best is a continuation equilibrium. Finally, it is easy to verify that given the value of e in (32), the two experts make the minimum pro…ts by implementing the …rst best.
Proof of Lemma 8: We let Expert 1 be responsible for technology cost and time input costs incurred by Expert 2, and pay a lump sum equal to 2 to satisfy Expert 2's minimum-pro…t constraint. Given the contract ( b ; b s), Expert 1's payo¤ from assigning Expert j, j = 1; 2, as the primary provider for project b is
where the …rst equality follows from (8) and the second equality follows from (9).
By the same argument in the proof of Lemma 2, Expert 1 with motivation parameter 1 , the least motivated Senior Partner, maximizes his payo¤ by choosing the …rst-best allocation. Moreover, his minimum-pro…t constraint just binds, Consider an Expert 1 who is more motivated, 1 > 1 . Replacing s and 1 + 2 in the proof for Lemma 3 by b s and 1 , respectively, we see that Expert 1 with motivation parameter 1 must have a binding minimum-pro…t constraint. The modi…ed Lemmas 2 and 3 imply a modi…ed Proposition 1, in which contract ( ; s )
is replaced by ( b ; b s), and any degree of motivation 1 + 2 is replaced by 1 . This is the statement of the lemma.
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